Decred

Decred pairs proof of work with proof of stake in a way that gives stakeholders a direct veto: miners produce blocks, but ticket holders vote on whether to accept them. The design exists specifically to prevent miners from controlling protocol direction against holders' wishes.

Stakeholders validate the miners

Holders lock DCR to buy tickets, and randomly selected tickets vote on each block. A block rejected by ticket voters does not count. Miners cannot force through changes or censor at will, because the people holding the asset have a structural check on them — a direct answer to the governance disputes that have split other proof-of-work chains.

Consensus changes are decided by vote

Protocol upgrades are activated by stakeholder voting rather than by whichever implementation node operators choose to run. Decred has changed consensus rules through this process repeatedly without a chain split, which is a demonstrated result rather than a design intention.

A treasury the stakeholders control

A share of the block reward funds a treasury, with spending decided by stakeholder vote. Development is funded by the protocol itself rather than by a company or foundation, which changes who development ultimately answers to.

Ticket locking has a real cost

Buying a ticket locks DCR until it votes or expires, which can take time. That illiquidity is what makes governance participation costly and therefore meaningful — it filters for holders with a durable interest rather than a momentary position.

Why it matters beyond its size

Decred is small relative to the major chains and has solved on-chain governance more completely than most. Its record of amending consensus rules by stakeholder vote without splitting is genuinely unusual, and it is the reason the project is studied more than it is traded.