USDT0
Best for independently tracked protocol
How it rates
- Audit report linked from a public dataset
- $3,294m recorded independently
- No accounting methodology published at this check
- Single-chain deployment
Each indicator scores 2, 1 or 0. A pillar is the points earned over the points available; the overall score is the weighted sum. Every source below is public — check any of them yourself.
- MetIndependent audit report linked publicly
Audit report linked from the public protocol dataset.
github.com/Everdawn-Labs/usdt0-audit-reports/blob/main/Guardian/2025-01- - Met
- MetTracked by an independent analytics platform
Listed with published value and history.
defillama.com/protocol/usdt0 - Not met
- Met
- Met
- MetProtocol economics published independently
Value and change history published.
defillama.com/protocol/usdt0 - Not met
- PartialFee or reward model documented publicly
Application reachable for review; specific rates not captured at this check.
usdt0.to - Met
- Met
- Met
- Met
- Not met
- Met
- Met
- MetAudit documentation linked
Linked publicly.
github.com/Everdawn-Labs/usdt0-audit-reports/blob/main/Guardian/2025-01- - Met
- Met
- Not met
- Met
- Met
- MetAudit links reachable
Linked.
github.com/Everdawn-Labs/usdt0-audit-reports/blob/main/Guardian/2025-01- - Not met
- Met
An omnichain representation of Tether holding $3.29bn, using burn-and-mint transfers rather than locked liquidity pools.
Our assessment
USDT0 holds $3.29bn with two audits and reports linked. It moves Tether between chains by burning on the source and minting on the destination, rather than locking assets in a pool and issuing wrapped claims.
Burn-and-mint avoids the honeypot
Lock-and-mint bridges accumulate a large pool of real assets, which is what makes them the most attractive target in DeFi. Burn-and-mint keeps no such pool: supply moves rather than being duplicated. The failure mode shifts from having a vault drained to having unauthorised minting — a different attack, and one with no pot of gold sitting still.
Unauthorised minting is the risk to understand
If an attacker can mint on a destination chain without a corresponding burn, they create tokens from nothing and sell them into whatever liquidity exists. The damage is bounded by market depth rather than by a vault balance, which can be better or worse depending on the chain. The verification logic is what stands between the two.
One canonical representation
Chains commonly end up with several incompatible versions of the same stablecoin from different bridges — a genuine source of user loss when someone sends the wrong one. A single canonical omnichain representation solves that fragmentation, which is a practical benefit users notice only when it is missing.
Who it suits
USDT0 fits users moving Tether between supported chains who prefer burn-and-mint mechanics. Users bridging other assets should compare Portal, which holds the strongest evidence profile here.
How rivals compare
| Service | Score | Best for | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Portal | 9.6 | audited protocol with published methodology | Read → |
Frequently asked
Does this score mean USDT0 is safe?
No. It measures what an outsider can verify: linked audits, published methodology and independently recorded data. Contract and custody risk are not tested by us.
Where do these figures come from?
A public analytics dataset queried at the verification date, plus the audit reports it links. Anyone can re-run the query.
Why do some protocols score zero on audits?
Because no audit report is linked in the public record. It records what a user can reach, not a claim that no audit exists.