Euler V2
Best for audited protocol with published methodology
How it rates
- Audit report linked from a public dataset
- Accounting methodology published
- TVL of $352m recorded independently
- Several indicators could not be verified from public sources at this check
Each indicator scores 2, 1 or 0. A pillar is the points earned over the points available; the overall score is the weighted sum. Every source below is public — check any of them yourself.
- MetIndependent audit report linked publicly
Audit report linked from the public protocol dataset.
www.euler.finance/#security - Met
- MetTracked by an independent analytics platform
Listed with published TVL and history.
defillama.com/protocol/euler-v2 - MetAccounting methodology published in the dataset
Methodology published.
defillama.com/protocol/euler-v2 - MetApplication reachable at a public address
Reachable without an account at this check.
www.euler.finance
- MetApplication reachable without an account
Reachable without an account at this check.
www.euler.finance - MetProtocol economics published independently
TVL and change history published.
defillama.com/protocol/euler-v2 - Met
- PartialFee or reward model documented publicly
Application reachable for review; specific rates not captured at this check.
www.euler.finance - MetNo account required to reach the application
Reachable without an account at this check.
www.euler.finance
- Met
- Met
- Not met
- Met
- MetListed on the dataset for over a year
Listing date recorded in the dataset.
defillama.com/protocol/euler-v2
- MetIndependent analytics page published
Public protocol page with history.
defillama.com/protocol/euler-v2 - Met
- Met
- Met
- Met
- Met
- Met
- Met
- Met
- Met
A modular lending protocol holding $352m across 16 chains, rebuilt and re-audited after a major 2023 exploit whose funds were almost fully returned.
Our assessment
Euler v2 holds $352m across 16 chains with two audits and reports linked. Any assessment has to include March 2023, when the previous version was exploited for roughly $197m — and the unusual outcome that followed.
The 2023 exploit and the return
A flaw in a donation function allowed an attacker to create an artificially undercollateralised position and drain the protocol. Following negotiation, essentially all of the funds were returned — an outcome with almost no parallel at that scale. The team then rebuilt rather than relaunching the same code, which is the response our transparency pillar is designed to reward.
Modular markets by design
v2 lets anyone create a lending vault with its own parameters, oracles and collateral rules, rather than routing everything through one governed pool. This gives flexibility and shifts risk assessment onto the user: two vaults on the same protocol can have entirely different safety profiles, and the protocol's name tells you nothing about which one you are in.
Read the vault, not the brand
On modular protocols, the question is never "is Euler safe" but "who curated this vault, what oracle does it use, and what collateral does it accept". A depositor who skips that has not evaluated the risk they are taking, regardless of how well the base layer scores.
Who it suits
Euler fits experienced users who will evaluate individual vaults and want permissionless market creation. Users who want a single governed risk surface should use Aave or Compound.
How rivals compare
Frequently asked
Does this score mean Euler V2 is safe?
No. It measures what an outsider can verify: linked audits, published methodology and independently recorded market data. Contract risk is not tested by us.
Where do the TVL and audit figures come from?
A public analytics dataset queried at the verification date, plus the audit reports it links. Both are re-runnable by anyone.
Why do some protocols score zero on audits?
Because no audit report is linked in the public record. The indicator records what a user can reach, not a claim that no audit exists.